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THE TRADEMARK CONFUSION TEST-GOOD OR BAD;
WEAK OR STRONG?
Long before the more sophisticated problems of Trademark Law had
taken root, man impressed various symbols upon the work of his hands,'
as a means of identifying its source. These symbols stood in place of the
maker's name, and served as a guide for consumers, both those who were
satisfied with the goods and now knew where they could purchase more of
like quality, and those who were dissatisfied, who now knew how to avoid
the product, and more particularly, its producer. 2 While this basic function
of the trademark has remained relatively constant throughout the years, its
legal status has not been so static. This article will be devoted primarily
to the standards which the Lanham Act of 1940 and a segment of the
present common law of unfair competition apply to the protection of trade-
marks? Such an objective, however, necessitates some analysis of history
and terminology before entering the uncertain terrain bounded by post-
Lanham trademark decisions.
COMMON LAW
Fundamentally, the American law of trademarks "is still a creature of
the common law."s At the outset, it would be wise then to inquire into the
kinds of words° and symbols accorded trademark status at common law,
and the scope of protection provided them thereunder.
The mere fact that a manufacturer employed a word or symbol as his
mark did not automatically preclude another's use of the same. An im-
mediate distinction came to be drawn between a mark which was coined or
arbitrary as applied, and one which identified the product by describing its
properties, indicating its geographical origin, or using its maker's name.
The former type of mark, which shall be referred to hereafter as strong,
was considered protectable since it was "specially and peculiarly significant
and suggestive of one man's goods."' Also, owing to the fact that it was in-
vented, a limitation on its use would in no way deplete the reservoir of
language. On the other hand, the latter or weak mark, possessing neither
of these attributes, received no common law protection at the time of its
1 "Symbols have been used to identify the ownership or origin of articles for at
least 4,000 years." I Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade Marks 509
(4th ed. 1947), citing Schecter, The Historical Foundation of the Law Relating to
Trade Marks (1925).
2 "The primary and proper function of the trademark is to identify origin of
ownership of the goods to which it is affixed." Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240
U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
3 60 Stat. 509 (1954), 15 U.S.C. H 1051-1127 (1958), amending, 60 Stat. 426 (1946).
4 The common law of unfair competition as spoken of in this article will be limi-
ted solely to its trademark implications. While in broader form unfair competition
can encompass such unethical practices as trade disparagement and commercial bribery,
these activities are beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Restatement, Torts 715, comment (f), at 558 (1938).
6 The first use of words and names as trademarks is dated back to at least the
early nineteenth century. I Nims, supra note 1, at 510-511.
7 France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925).
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adoption!' If however at some later date, it could be shown to have ac-
quired a "secondary meaning," i.e., a peculiar significance in the mind of the
buyer relating the marked good to its specific source, then the weak mark,
despite its more plebian past, could be successfully defended.°
The common law trademark protection given to both strong and weak
marks was founded on, and limited by, the "passing off" doctrine of unfair
competition. This view took the position that since a mark was used to
identify the producer of goods, another maker should not be allowed to
appropriate the same mark to take advantage of the first user's reputation
and good will and thus be in a position to fool the public.'° A person could
not ". . therefore be allowed to use names, letters or other indicia by which
he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling are
the manufacture of another. . . ."" The courts sought to protect the con-
sumer from having one producer's goods "palmed off" upon him as those
of another whose goods the consumer had purchased before. Until at least
the end of the nineteenth century, trademark protection via unfair competi-
tion was restricted to situations involving directly competitive goods." 2 This
limitation was founded on an acceptance to the semantical tautology that un-
fair competition must imply competition, without consideration of whether
the deception itself could occur only in that circumstance.
ACT OF 1905
The first significant attempt at a codification of standards to protect
trademarks from infringement took the form of the federal Trade-Mark
Act of 1905.' 3
 This statute provided that no marks "which are descriptive
of the goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality of
such goods, or merely a geographical name or term, shall be registered. . . . 7)14
The mark differentiation formula initiated under the common law was there-
by incorporated into the Act, and immediate statutory sanction was given
to only the strong trademark. Some acknowledgement though, was also
8 "Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade,
of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, [or its geographical origin] be employed
as a trade mark...." Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871).
9 "It [secondary meaning theory] contemplates that a word or phrase originally,
and in that sense primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an
article on the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might never-
theless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to
his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word
or phrase had come to mean that the article was his product; in other words, had come
to be, to them, his trade-mark." G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373
(6th Cir. 1912).
1° "[T]he law has always forbidden one trader to pass off his article of trade as
that of a rival trader." Midwest Plastics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., 285 F.2d
747, 750 (10th Cir. 1960).
11 James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9
(6th Cir. 1942).
12 Developments in the Law, Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 814, 844 (1954-55). [Hereinafter -cited as Developments.]
19 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
14 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726.
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made of the common law doctrine of "secondary meaning" relative to a
weak mark. Any mark which had been in "actual and exclusive use" for the
ten years preceeding the Act's adoption could be registered, regardless of
whether it would be otherwise subject to the exclusion tests of the Act.°
The controlling assumption was that such use must a priori have produced
a special significance in the mark. Unfortunately the Act made no reference
to marks which might acquire such meaning after its passage.
As to the infringement test itself, the owner of a registered mark was
given a right of action against "any person who shall ... reproduce, counter-
feit, copy, or colorably imitate any such trade-mark and affix the same to
merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set
forth in the registration. . . . "16 Under the common law the crucial factor
in establishing trade mark infringement was deceptive use on competitive
products; 17 under the statute it was imitative use on "merchandise of sub-
stantially the same descriptive properties."' The latter test itself proved
deceptive in interpretation and application. It has been suggested that the
1905 Act simply codified the law of unfair competition of the time." If so,
then a "descriptive properties" requirement was but another way of protect-
ing only marks on competitive goods. While in a literal sense this position
seems quite reasonable, it was not always substantiated in cases decided
under the 1905 Act. Similarly, weak marks were not offered a uniform level
of protection under the Act, nor under the subsequent common law. These
developments are our next concern.
A leading decision on the "descriptive properties" test, limiting the
Act's application to competitive products, was handed down by. the Sixth
Circuit in Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson." The plaintiff had a strong
registered trademark on pharmaceutical preparations. Defendant began to
put out an inferior cigar under the same mark and sold it to drug stores
which patronized plaintiff's products, on the representation that it was a
new product made by plaintiff. While the court did enjoin defendant on
the common law unfair competition doctrine of "passing off," it could not
find for plaintiff under the statute even though the buying public had been
deceived, and were confused as to the origin of the goods. 2 ' This was due
to the fact that cigars did not have the same "descriptive properties" . as
medicines.
There were, however, few similar cases in which confusion of origin
existed and statutory relief was denied because of the absence of goods
15 Ibid.
16 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728.
n Supra note 12.
15 Supra note 17.
16 S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Or. 1949).
20 247 Fed. 658 (6th Cir. 1917).
21 The standard tests for whether the public is likely to be confused are set out
in Triumph Mills Inc. v. Triumph Intl. Corp., 308 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1962),
considered later in the text. They are the similarity of the marks, proximitiy of the
products, sophistication of the buyers, strength of the mark and actual confusion.
Actual confusion, if found, is of course determinative of its likelihood.
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of the same descriptive properties.22 Significant in this regard was the
decision of Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson.23 The plaintiff sought registra-
tion of the trademark "Yale" for his flashlights. Defendant counterclaimed
on the ground that it was a prior user of the mark on many kinds of hard-
ware, especially locks, and that plaintiff's use of the mark was confusing
defendant's buyers. Judge Learned Hand accepted the defendant's proposi-
tion, reasoning that defendant had an action in unfair competition founded
upon the confusion, and the 1905 Act could not be interpreted to allow
registration of a mark which could then be immediately enjoined from
use. This the court admitted, did "some violence to the language" 24 of des-
criptive properties, since locks and flashlights were of substantially different
construction. More important the test became one of whether confusion
would result from the dual use, regardless of the lack of competition between
the products.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-1905-1946
A contemporaneous development in the common law of unfair competi-
tion must now be considered. As noted previously, at the time the 1905
Act was passed all unfair competition trademark actions involved instances
of direct competition. Yet in both Peninsular and Yale the observation was
made that the common law would enjoin a confusing use in a non-competi-
tive situation, and in Yale this was critical to the interpretation of the
statute itself. The dilemma is partially resolved in Vogue Co. v. Thompson-
Hudson Co.,25
 in which a magazine sued a hat manufacturer for infringe-
ment of its trademark. The court did not protect plaintiff on his statutory
trade mark rights, seemingly because the two goods were not of the same
"descriptive properties," as in Peninsular. But it did find unfair competition,
explaining that:
This rule is usually invoked when there is an actual market
competition between the analogous products of the plaintiff and
the defendants, and so it has been natural enough to speak of it
as the doctrine of unfair competition; but there is no fetish in the
word "competition." The invocation of equity rests more vitally
upon the unfairness.26
The unfairness referred to is the confusion which may occur whether the
products are competitive or not. Since confusion has become of such signifi-
cance both under the Act and the common law, it is necessary to reconsider
strong and weak marks, relative to this issue.
STRENGTH OF MARK—CONFUSION
In the case of Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co.,27 the Seventh
Circuit held that the validly registered weak mark "Blue Ribbon," first
22 Supra Developments, note 12, at 845, n.235.
23 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
24 Id. at 974.
25 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
20 Id. at 512.
27 284 Fed. 110 (7th Or. 1922).
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used on beer, was not infringed by its subsequent use on malt extract or
syrup. The basis for the decision was not that the two goods were of different
"descriptive properties." It was rather the fact that "Blue Ribbon" was a
term of very wide and general employment; that it had been used many
times as a trademark on diverse kinds of goods; that it was a quality term
indicating high merit; and that therefore "there was no likelihood of any
confusion of its (appellee's) product with that of appellant." 28 There can
be no question that it is legitimate to consider the strength of the mark as
one factor in determining whether there is likely to be confusion. Thus if
the public was so accustomed to the encomium "Blue Ribbon" as to be
aware that its use on beer and malt extract did not signify a single source
for both products, there would be no infringement. But what remains deter-
minative is the confusion, and the strength of the mark serves only a sub-
sidiary evidentiary function.
Unfortunately as the courts continued to grade the marks in reaching
their decisions, they became so enamoured of the distinction that cases were
decided solely on the issue of the trademark's strength, with a descriptive
mark being given narrow protection due to its weakness alone, and not be-
cause its descriptiveness had narrowed the area of confusion?° Thus the
means had become the end, the servant the master. An extreme example of
this point of view is the case of Pease v. Scott County Milling Co." Here the
court held, in finding no infringement of the weak mark Noxall:
A distinctive name, such as "Kodak," "Budweiser," "Ford," "Aunt
Jemima," "Penslar" and "Delmonte," will be broadly protected in
all cases where damage [confusion) will be inflicted by unauthor-
ized use; while words like "Blue Ribbon," "Star," and "Noxall,"
and other words of like character, will be protected only within
the range of use upon similar goods. 8 '
The import of this rule of law seems inescapable. While a strong mark like
Penslar will be protected upon a showing of confusion both under the
common law and the 1905 Act, if the "descriptive properties" test is not
literally applied, a valid weak mark will be protected "only within the range
of use upon similar goods," regardless of whether confusion would result
from its use on dissimilar ones. While the Pease court had earlier in its deci-
sion concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion, its rule has been
given effect in confusion situations." It in fact subtly changed the "descrip-
tive properties" test to a test of descriptiveness of the mark itself.
Thus, by the year 1946, when the present federal Trademark Statute,
the Lanham Act, was passed, common and statutory law were again on the
28 Id. at 113.
20 "Most . . . cases narrow rights on the ground of descriptiveness and third party
usuage, but without stating that this narrowing of rights actually narrows the area
of confusion, much less explaining why it would." Garner, Narrow and Weak Trade
Marks, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 40, 42 (1953).
80 5 F.2d 524 (E.D. Mo. 1925).
31 Id. at 526.
32 Cf. text accompanying note 49 infra.
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same level, though having sought it in different ways. With the exception
of the courts still strictly construing "descriptive properties" under the
Act of 1905,33
 confusion was the universal trademark test, and similar
overemphasis was given the mark's strength both under the statute and the
common law.
THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act of 1946 allowed the registration of a number of weak
marks which would not have been accepted under the terms of the 1905
Act. Thus where the prior Act denied registration of marks which were
descriptive of goods, or of their character or quality," Lanham denies
registration only to a mark which "when applied to the goods of the appli-
cant is merely descriptive ... of them."35 (Emphasis added.) The phrase bar-
ring marks which were "merely a geographic name or term"35
 (emphasis
added) was reworded to exclude only those marks which were "primarily geo-
graphically descriptive"37
 (emphasis added) when applied to the applicant's
goods. The section prohibiting registration of a mark which consisted "merely
in the name of any individual"35 was changed to bar only a mark "primarily
merely a surname."39 (Emphasis added.) While this new phraseology should
of itself allow some weak marks to gain initial statutory protection im-
possible before, more important is Section 2(f) of Lanham which provides
that, with a few irrelevant exceptions, "nothing herein shall prevent
registration of a mark . . . which has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce." 40
 This adoption of the common law "secondary mean-
ing" doctrine should accord all weak marks, once they have attained a
significance of their own, the statutory benefits of registration 4 1
The test of infringement of a registered mark is contained in section
320) (a), providing the owner of a registered mark a remedy by way of an
infringement action from any use by another which "is likely to cause con-
fusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 42 This confusion test in the 1946
Act replaced formally the "descriptive properties" test of the 1905 Act, if
it had not already replaced it in substance. On its face, it is to be applicable
to all registered marks, weak and strong. Lending credence to this conclusion
that confusion is the sole applicable standard is the following statement
of the Congressional Committee which sponsored the Lanham Act:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One
is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing
88 Cf. text accompanying note 21 supra.
84 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Suit. 724, 726 (1905).
35 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1958).
30 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726 (1905).
n 60 Stat. 429, § 2(e) (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1958).
Bs Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726 (1905).
89 60 Stat. 429, § 2(e) (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1958).
40 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1958).
41 For a more expansive treatment of Lanham registration provisions, see Develop-
ments, supra note 12, at 825-36.
42 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1958).
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a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.
Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the public
and the trade-mark owner. . . . Your committee believes the pro-
posed bill accomplishes these two broad basic principles."
It is obvious that unless a validly registered weak mark is protected in a
confusion situation, the first objective mentioned by the Committee can not
be achieved, since it is precisely in a confusion situation that the public is
denied what it asks for and needs. Since the owner of a weak mark must of
necessity spend energy, time and money in building up a "secondary mean-
ing," his investment and the second interest of the Committee will both be
defeated, if a second and confusing use were to be permitted.
POST-LANHAM: STRENGTH OF MARK-CONFUSION
Within three years after the passage of the Lanham Act however, the
Second Circuit in S. C. Johnson & Son Inc. v. Johnson" refused to apply
the confusion test in the same manner to a weak mark as to a strong, and
in so doing limited the accomplishments which the Lanham committee could
justifiably claim. The plaintiff, a maker of waxes and polishes, was the first
user and valid registrant of the mark Johnson. Its subsequent use on de-
fendant's non-competitive cleaning fluid had caused confusion. While these
facts would have been sufficient to call for an injunction had the mark been
strong, it was graded weak, and as such the plaintiff had "two, but only
two" interests in it.
(1) The possibility that the trade practices of the second user
may stain the owner's reputation in the minds of his customers;
and (2) the possibility that at some time in the future he may
wish to extend his business into that market which the second
user had begun to exploit."
These interests would allow plaintiff exclusive use of the mark only if they
outweighed the right of the second user to employ it—defendant's interest
here being the "customary and innocent identification of his goods with
himself."4° Judge Hand, coincidentally the writer of the Yale opinion,
founded this result upon his belief that the Lanham Act merely codified
the law of unfair competition as it existed in 1946. Thus the elusive "des-
criptive properties" test was now confusion, but the strength of the mark
was also determinative of the scope of protection afforded. True, the com-
48 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946).
44 Supra note 20.
45 Id. at 180. These interests depend on such factors as the quality of defendant's
product, the likelihood that the quality, if high, will not diminish in the future and
the probabilities of plaintiff's entering the defendant's field.
46 Id. at 180.
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mon law had treated it in like manner, but only because of a failure to
correctly apply the strength of the mark as a factual issue in determining
confusion "r There is little reason why common law errors should be codified,
when they can as easily be eliminated. Yet in Johnson, despite a finding of
confusion which the court readily makes, the plaintiff was denied relief
because his mark was weak.
The following year the Ninth Circuit took a parallel position in Sun-
beam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp." The plaintiff held a registered weak
trademark (Sunbeam) on electric flatirons, machines and supplies. The court
held that it was not infringed by its subsequent use on fluorescent electric
fixtures. If this decision departed in any way from the Johnson rationale,
it was only to narrow further the protection of a weak mark. The first legi-
timate interest acknowledged a senior user in Johnson, that of preservation
of reputation, is characterized by the Sunbeam court as an occupational
hazard," and not a protectable interest. More important the court adopts
the language of the Pease case, limiting the protection of a weak mark
"within the range of use on similar goods." 5° It is quite possible that this
restriction is even more severe than the Johnson balance test, since there
plaintiff could at least attempt to demonstrate that his equities outweighed
defendant's, though the goods were dissimilar. But the "similar goods" test
makes actionable only competitive or quasi-competitive uses."
Under the above theories, the strength of the mark is as critical to the
decision as confusion. For if confusion is found, a strong mark is immediately
protected but a weak one is not, unless, depending on the circuit in which
the issue is raised, either plaintiff's interests prevail over defendant's or the
use is on similar goods.
Yet even these two circuits have wavered in their adherence to this
philosophy. The Ninth Circuit in the case of Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co.52 was able to suggest, if inferentially, that no distinction
need be made as to the strength of the mark. The plaintiff held a registered
trademark "Black and White" on scotch whiskey and the defendant had
begun to use the same mark on beer. Confusion was found but on the Sun-
beam theory, plaintiff's mark, if weak, would prevail only if scotch and beer
could be considered similar goods. Needless to say, the court could not go
47 Supra note 30.
48 183 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1950).
49 If plaintiff's goods are so good that the mere mention of their trade-name
or mark would be sufficient for a reasonable person to select an article
bearing it, no matter how unrelated plaintiff's goods are to the article, then,
as it seems to us, plaintiff must suffer the price of virtue. If in course of our
free enterprise, someone would market an unworthy article outside plaintiff's
field bearing the name Sunbeam it must be borne as not an unlikely circum-
stance following plaintiff's selection of a non-fanciful word popular with
commercial concerns.
Id. at 972.
50 Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
51 "Similar goods" as a phrase is reminiscent of "descriptive properties." But as
applied by the Pease and Sunbeam courts, it never means just confusion, as in Yale.
52 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963).
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this far, but instead labelled the mark strong. The result then is consistent
with both Johnson and Sunbeam, but the reluctance of the court to grade
the mark gives an indication that confusion is regarded as the vital issue,
whether the mark be strong or weak. This of course would be antithetical to
both earlier holdings, but also a more accurate interpretation of the Lanham
Act.
The Second Circuit, the leading circuit in the trademark area, at least
in the number of cases decided, has a more speckled history. To return a
few years to 1953, the court in Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc. 53 repudiated
the very strong-weak distinction which it had so carefully laid out in
Johnson. In the lower court" defendant had argued that plaintiff's trade-
mark "Admiral," on radios and televisions, was not infringed by its later
use on sewing machines and vacuum cleaners, since the mark was weak and
not subject to protection. While this argument is probably more precisely
directed to a Sunbeam circuit, the court's answer is applicable to any attack
mounted on a mark's strength. "What is important, is not whether the
mark is a coined one or not but what the proof establishes as to what the
mark has come to mean in the trade" 55—whether it has acquired a "second-
ary meaning." Seemingly then where secondary meaning can be proven, a
weak mark is on a par with a strong one. The Second Circuit in upholding
the trial court, noted that the mark "Admiral" was technically weak, but
still found that "the fact that the products are not identical does not excuse
if they are sufficiently similar to make confusion likely."" (Emphasis added.)
This is an application of the confusion test to a weak mark under Lanham as
it should be made, without limitation or the need for additional inquiry.
Any fond hopes that the Second Circuit had abandoned more than
temporarily the Johnson rule were, however, to be denied. It made its re-
appearance in the case of Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal Inc." in 1960
and, perhaps refreshed by the slumber of its inactivity, returned in dimension
larger than it had at its departure. The plaintiff had adopted the strong trade-
mark "Haymaker"" and first used it on a line of women's shoes in 1941,
finally registering it in 1952. The defendant began to employ the same trade-
mark on sporting apparel, such as dresses and skirts, in the year 1945, "with-
out knowledge of the plaintiff's prior use."" This resulted in confusion.
The court, citing Johnson, decided that even though the mark was strong,
plaintiff had only two interests in it; protecting his reputation and his possi-
bility of extending his line into the market taken by defendant. Johnson is
dubious authority for a court which obliterates the strong-weak distinction,
whether it be done by making both type of marks infringed on a showing
of confusion, as in Admiral, or neither type infringed until a balance test is
53 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953).
54 Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
55 Id. at 1021.
56 Supra note 54, at 520.
57 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960).
3 R "The 'Haymaker' mark, which as applied to women's shoes, is fanciful and
arbitrary. . . ." Id. at 610.
59 Id. at 611.
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passed, as here. Still, the defendant's interest built up by fifteen years of
good faith use was sufficient to decide the case in his favor.
The good faith considered here revolves around defendant's lack of
knowledge of plaintiff's prior use of the mark. Even though the constructive
notice provision of Lanham is inapplicable in view of defendant's adoption of
the mark preceding registration by plaintiff," there seems no reason for
allowing defendant's good faith to give him an interest in the mark. The
United States Supreme Court in Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co.?'
interpreting the Act of 1905, which was without a constructive notice clause
argued:
[I]n view of this statutory right, it could not be considered nec-
essary that the complainant in order to establish infringement
should show wrongful intent on the part of the defendant, or facts
justifying the inference of such an intent. . . . Having duly regis-
tered under the act, the complainant would be entitled to protec-
tion against any infringing use. .. . 62
Indeed the Second Circuit in La Touraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee
Co.," citing Thaddeus Davids, refused to decide whether defendant's con-
duct was innocent since "when similarity is established, good faith—even
if proven—is no defense"" under Lanham. And since the infringement
test in the Lanham Act is confusion, it can make no difference whether the
goods be competitive, as in La Touraine, or simply confusing as to origin,
as in Avon. Be that as it may, after the Avon decision all marks were sub-
ject to an interest analysis before being afforded protection. The Lanham
committee, the buying public and the trademark owner might well admit to
confusion.
The Lanham test by now had been so mutated, if not mutiliated, that
a clear, concise restatement of the rule was certainly in order. Thus the same
Second Circuit in Triumph Mills Inc. v. Triumph Ina. Corp.," recognizing ,
that it was "difficult to reconcile all the decisions . . . dealing with this
problem" 6° set out to fill the need. "The full bench would now accept" the
following propositions set out in Polaroid Corp. v. Polerad Electronics Corp.° 7
Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of suc-
cess is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the
degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the
products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap,
actual confusion, and the reciprocal of the defendant's good faith
eo It is true that the Lanham Act indeed prevents a junior user from claiming
good faith when his use begins subsequent to a prior user's registration under
the Act. But that provision is inapplicable here. For the defendant's use com-
menced more than two years prior to the effective date of the Act.
Id. at 611.
67 233 U.S. 461 (1914).
02 Id. at 471.
es 157 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1946).
64 Id. at 118.
65 308 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1962).
66 Id. at 198.
67 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
Ia■
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in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and
the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does
not exhaust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other
variables into account."
This rule of law, with its potpourri of variables may in its unexhausted state
raise more problems than it solves. It must first be broken down into its
components, however, before any fair criticism can be levied.
The degree of mark similarity, product proximity, sophistication of the
buyers and actual confusion are all factual considerations which should have
no independent significance but rather relate to the decisive question as to
whether confusion 'of origin is likely to result from the two uses. Thus if the
marks are so similar that confusion is likely to result, it should not aid de-
fendant in any way that the buyers are sophisticated, and the products remote.
On the other hand, a naive clientele should not benefit plaintiff's cause of
action, if due to differences in the Marks, they are not likely to be confused.
All these elements are but means to an end, the determination of confusion,
and once the end is achieved, the means should be disregarded.
The quality of defendant's products and the likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap are restatements of the legitimate interests given
recognition for the benefit of the weak trademark owner in Johnson. They
are not considered only when the mark is weak though, as in Johnson. This
court recognizes that strength of the mark aids plaintiff's cause of action, but
the Johnson interests must under all circumstances be considered independ-
ently, as further strengthening, or perhaps weakening, his claim.
As contrasted with the possible interests of the first user above, the
defendant must rely on his good faith in adopting the mark. In Avon you
will recall, defendant's good faith was grounded on his appropriation of the
mark without knowledge of its earlier use, and before it was registered.
In the instant case plaintiff held a registered trademark "Triumph" on
women's stockings. Defendant sought to register "Triumph of Europe" for
use on women's foundation garments, and the application was 'refused.
Later when defendant began to use the mark "Distinction by Triumph of
Europe" on its product, this action was precipitated. The court suggests
that a bona fide junior user is one "whose use is not attributable to intent
to obtain a free ride on the reputation of the owner of the trade-mark.""
This position is immediately open to the same objections advanced to the
"good faith" interest in Avon." It suffers one additional handicap. In Avon,
as mentioned, the constructive notice provision of Lanhani could not be ap-
plied since the adoption preceded registration. Here not only did de-
fendant possess this constructive notice,n but he had actual notice of plain-
68 Id. at 495.
ae Supra note 66, at 199.
78 Good faith was not a legitimate interest under the 1905 Act, and in no way
negates the existence of confusion.
71 "Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this Act or under
the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall be constructive notice
of the registrant's claim of ownership." 60 Stat. 427, § 23. (1946), 15 U.S.G. 1072
(1958).
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tiff's prior use of the mark. This court is in effect saying that the con-
structive notice provision of Lanham, which of its nature is designed to
increase registrant's rights in his trademark, affords less protection than the
1905 Act, which is silent as to good faith. Such reasoning must be rejected.
It is no easier to determine the statutory trademark test after Triumph
than it was before. It is clearer what the test is not. "Confusion indeed is a
factor to consider. But it is not conclusive. . . . "72 It should be, if only
because defendant can summon up no legitimate interest in the mark, once
confusion is shown. But even if the possibility of a good faith defense were
conceded, the rationale could not be.
The Triumph test sets up eight variable factual considerations, and
suggests that even others may have to be considered. Any and all of these
interests may strengthen the position of either the first or second user, and
weights are assigned to none. Plaintiff may prevail despite the absence of
the Johnson interests," likewise defendant might triumph even if "non-
innocent."74
 Anything is possible in between. Somewhere within this ple-
thera of "propositions" trademark infringement will be adjudged, but
temporarily at least, the trees loom large, the forest obscure.
LANHAM AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Some comparison can now be made between statutory trademark pro-
tection and the present common law variety. A focal point is the case of
Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co.,75 recently
decided by the District Court of Wisconsin. There an unusual fact situation
was presented to the court. The junior user of the mark "Land O'Lakes,"
the strength of which was not expressly determined, sued the senior user
for cancellation of the trademark registration, on ground of abandonment.
Confusion was present, but the court concluded, citing Avon, that this would
not be enough in itself to support a Lanham action; since, if a senior user
must bear in some instances the consequences of a later use, a junior user
must in similar circumstances be forced to tolerate an earlier one. The John-
son interests test was also tacitly adopted. "[T] he likelihood of confusion
as to the source of origin of goods ... has not been shown to cause or
threaten to cause injury to plaintiff's economic status, its reputation and
good will, or to any other lawful interest in the mark." 7° On this basis plain-
tiff was denied statutory relief.
As to unfair competition, the Land O'Lakes court finds against plain-
tiff primarily because he was the latecomer in the mark, and the confusion
resulted from the legitimate natural expansion of the mark by both parties.
72 Supra note 66, at 200.
73 "We agree that it would not necessarily be fatal to the grant of an injunction
that neither of two "Aunt Jemima" [Johnson] conditions existed." Supra note 66, at
199.
II "Even if the [trial] judge below was right in finding that the defendants were
not 'innocent. junior users' it was erroneous to hold that this fact of itself justified the
injunction." Supra note 66, at 199.
75 221.F. Supp. 576 (ED. Wis. 1963)•
70 Id. at 583.
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But the decision does infer that circumstances could exist whereby an action
in unfair competition would be sustained, although the Lanham Act could
offer no protection. These circumstances, the court contends, did exist in
Polaroid Corporation v. Polaroid Inc.," decided by the Seventh Circuit.
In this Polaroid case, the plaintiff had a very strong registered trade-
mark on photographic equipment, and the defendant's use of an imitative
mark in his refrigeration and heating business had resulted in confusion.
The good faith of the defendant was in serious doubt. Plaintiff brought his
action in three counts: statutory trade-mark infringement, unfair competi-
tion and dilution. The court found in his favor on the second and third
causes of action, but did not decide whether Lanham applied, although
noting it was the weakest of the causes of action.
It is now imperative to discern the elements in Polaroid which sustain
an unfair competition suit. Competition between the goods is not required,
particularly where the trademark is "invented and coined." 78 This is the
common law confusion test of 1946, and it is not likely that overemphasis
as to the strength of the mark will limit its application since "equity will
enjoin the appropriation ... where the resemblance is so close that it is
likely to produce confusion to the injury of . . . the name. . . ."78 But con-
fusion, if and when it is found, is itself the injury to the mark.
If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation whose quality
no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even
though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its
use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor
and creator, and another can use it only as a mask. And so it
has come to be recognized that unless the borrower's use is so
foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of
the two, it is unlawful. 8°
Determination of injury then is the dividing line between the present
statutory and common law. The Polaroid test allows an injunction where-
ever confusion results in injury, and since confusion a priori results in in-
jury, both strong and weak marks are protected on a showing of confusion.
On the other hand, the Johnson, Avon and Triumph interpretations of Lan-
ham view injury as a factual consideration distinct from confusion. It is
to be determined by an investigation of the Johnson interests, whether
plaintiff's reputation is endangered by the second use, whether plaintiff
would possibly produce the product now the defendant's line. The good faith
interest which the above statutory decisions have afforded the second user,
is denied him at common law. Thus it is clear why Polaroid considered it
more difficult to prove statutory infringement, since it would be necessary
to evaluate all these interests, over and above the crucial common law
question of confusion.
77 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
78 Id. at 835.
78 Id. at 836, paraphrasing the language in American Steel Foundries v. Robert-
son, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1925).
so Id. at 835 quoting Yale v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
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•
	 CONCLUSION
Trademark protection has come a long way since the time it protected
only against competitive use. But it has yet to complete its journey. The
common law, unless it again becomes bogged on fruitless considerations of
the strength of the mark for its own sake, seems to have found the most
sensible solution in the confusion test.. Lanham Act interpretations do not
have so much to recommend them. Until both strong and weak mark own-
ers are protected in their trademark on a confusion test alone, the public
will not get what it wants, and the time and effort of the mark's registrant
will be partly in vain. The interest test of Johnson and the "relative vari-
ables" of Triumph have irresistably led to confusion. It would be far
better to simply make confusion the test. Since, despite their separate
courses the common and statutory law have come in the past to apply the
same test, there is room for hope that they will do so again, and, that they
will choose wisely.
THOMAS F. COLLINS
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